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Abstract
This paper examines the role of the tax-free income tax threshold in a complex
tax and transfer system consisting of a range of taxes and beneﬁts, each with their
own taper rates and thresholds. Considering a range of tax and beneﬁt systems,
particularly those having beneﬁt taper rates whereby some beneﬁts are received by
income groups other than those at the bottom of the distribution, it is suggested that
a tax-free threshold is not a necessary requirement to achieve redistribution. A policy
change involving the elimination of the tax-free threshold in Australia and designed
to achieve approximate revenue neutrality is examined using the Melbourne Institute
Tax and Transfer Simulator. The results demonstrate that it is possible to eliminate
the tax-free threshold under approximate overall revenue and distribution neutrality,
but that labour supply incentives cannot be improved at the same time.
∗We are grateful to Norman Gemmell for prompting us to examine tax reforms involving elimination of
the tax-free threshold in Australia, and Rienk Asscher for comments on an earlier draft.
11 Introduction
This paper examines the role of a tax-free threshold in income tax structures. Such a thresh-
old, below which the income tax rate is zero, is a feature of many tax systems and was ini-
tially motivated largely by equity considerations. However, this feature is not required in an
integrated tax and transfer structure. Those countries without a tax-free threshold usually
have some kind of tax rebate to deal with distributional objectives in low-income ranges.
The simultaneous payment of income tax and receipt of beneﬁts is a feature of modern tax
a n dt r a n s f e rs y s t e m sw h i c hc a no n l yb ea v o i d e d by raising the tax-free thresholds to a very
high level. This would provide a tax cut for everyone, and so would require complementary
adjustments to other features of the tax structure, if only to maintain revenue-neutrality,
without which alternative policies cannot be properly compared.1
In policy debates on tax and welfare reform, the tax-free threshold is often seen as a
crucial equity component. Criticism of a lack of indexation of the threshold is accompanied
by arguments in favour of raising it to a level which ensures that no individual in receipt
of transfer payments actually pays income tax.2 However, in a structure with many means-
tested beneﬁts involving taper, or beneﬁt withdrawal, rates such that some beneﬁts are
not conﬁned to the lower-income ranges, this could prove diﬃcult to achieve. What really
matters in a complex multi-tax and transfer structure is the overall redistributive eﬀect: an
early clear statement of this view was made by Hicks (1946, p. 150) who dated its realisation
from the last quarter of the 19th century. Raising the threshold in order to help low-income
groups actually has a low ‘target eﬃciency’ in that it involves at least the same absolute
gains by those subject to higher marginal tax rates.
Careful consideration of practical design aspects of taxes and transfers, using a microsim-
ulation model, makes it possible to achieve an elimination of the tax-free threshold which is
both approximately distribution and revenue neutral, although marginal eﬀective tax rates
1For example, Saunders (2006, p. xxvi) argues that, ‘At the same time as the top marginal rate is
reduced, the tax-free threshold should be raised to a level above the welfare minimum (subsistence) level ...
it would mean that all taxpayers enjoyed a substantial tax cut’. He does not mention compensating changes
to other forms of revenue or expenditure along with this revenue-reducing reform, so it is unclear how this
policy change would be ﬁnanced and what the impact of this alternative revenue-generating process would
be.
2For example, Saunders and Maley (2006, p. 113) argue that, ‘The principled case for raising the
threshold is that workers should be allowed to earn and retain enough money to meet their own subsistence
needs before any tax is taken away from them.’ However, the principle involved (whether of a basic value
judgement or an eﬃciency criterion) is not actually mentioned. A similar argument for raising the threshold
was made by Veit-Wilson (1999), who showed that in practice in the UK there had been no coordination
between those responsible for tax thresholds and those responsible for setting beneﬁt levels.
2for middle to higher incomes are increased.
In order to place the debate regarding the role of the tax-free threshold in perspective,
Section 2 examines early views when income taxation was ﬁrst introduced. In structures
containing few — if any — transfer payments and a large number of individuals below the
threshold who were considered to be at a subsistence level, and where income tax revenue
formed a relatively low proportion of total tax revenue, the threshold played an important
role. However, unlike current systems, the tax structure was designed to achieve propor-
tionality at higher income levels, involving a type of rate ‘degression’ discussed in Section
2. Section 3 considers alternative tax and transfer systems, paying attention to the need
to make revenue-neutral comparisons. The role of tax rebates is examined, along with the
possibility of achieving a revenue- and distribution-neutral change involving abolition of the
tax-free threshold. A policy simulation for Australia is reported in Section 4, using the Mel-
bourne Institute’s behavioural microsimulation model MITTS. Conclusions are in Section
5.
2 Early Views on Income Taxation
In early discussions on income tax, considerably more attention was given to the subject of
diﬀerentiation by income source rather than the question of progression.3 Indeed, the use of
diﬀerent tax rates according to the source of income (particularly with regard to ‘permanent’
and ‘temporary’ incomes) was discussed ‘with a sophistry comparable only to that of later
scholastic logic’ (Shehab, 1953).4 Attitudes to progression were inﬂuenced by the dominance
of an ‘ability to pay’ view of the role of taxation, concentrating on the sacriﬁce made. This
is in contrast with a ‘beneﬁt’ or quid pro quo view according to which taxation should
relate to the beneﬁts obtained from the resulting tax-ﬁnanced activity.5 Given the huge
importance for the classical economists of the concept of a ‘subsistence’ level, and since
there was no signiﬁcant system of transfer payments (as relief to the poor involved entry
to the dreaded ‘workhouse’) it is not surprising that there was virtually universal support
3Five separate schedules for diﬀerent sources, operated in the UK from 1803, when the income tax was
ﬁrst introduced as a temporary revenue-raising measure during the Napoleonic Wars. They lasted for 150
years.
4In the UK, much of the discussion was associated with various Select Committees appointed by Glad-
stone during his long attempt to repeal the income tax reintroduced by Peel in 1842. Later, debate was
stimulated by two Royal Commissions (Colwyn, 1920; Radcliﬀe,1955). For a survey of the history of public
ﬁnance, see Creedy (1984), and for a collection of writings on taxation, see O’Brien (1999).
5Some people argued that these were equivalent because the state provided the protection and rights
under which all incomes are obtained, while others believed that beneﬁts were too diﬃcult to assign.
3for the idea of a tax-free income range. But, other than the acceptance of such a range,
there was little acceptance of a redistributive role for income taxation.6 Clariﬁcation of
the utilitarian arguments relating to decreasing marginal utility — which imply progression
only under special conditions — was not provided until the work of Cohen Stuart (1889) and
Edgeworth (1897).
A simple ‘equal sacriﬁce’ approach was taken, particularly by Mill (1848), in the context
of an ‘ability to pay’ approach. He provided an early argument for the use of a single tax rate
applied to all incomes measure in excess of the subsistence level, and in this he was strongly
supported by McCulloch (1845).7 This system gives rise to an increasing average tax rate
for those above the threshold, so that despite a constant marginal tax rate it is progressive
(and inequality reducing). However, the principle that the tax-free threshold should apply
to all incomes was not actually adopted in the UK until after the Royal Commission of
1920: see Shehab (1953, pp. 93, 246) for details. The system in use for many years involved
taxation of gross income above the threshold, but with a gradual ‘shading in’ of the tax
rate until the point where a ﬁxed rate applied.8 Hence many higher-income taxpayers were
subject to a constant marginal and average tax rate. Another similar system involves a
gradual reduction in the tax-free threshold as income increases, until it is ‘exhausted’ and
the tax is proportional. Hence the UK system for many years was more strictly described,
using the now unfamiliar term, as ‘degressive’ rather than progressive, because it implied a
ﬁxed average rate beyond a certain amount.9
As redistribution came to be accepted as a legitimate role of government, most income
tax schemes not only applied a common tax-free threshold to all income levels (as well
as introducing various personal ‘allowances’, often positively related to income), but also
introduced a progressive (‘graduated’) tax rate scale. This often involved a large number of
marginal rates, increasing to very high levels: for an historical overview of the Australian
6Sabine (1980, p. 130) states, ‘Until 1894 its only real concession to equity was a comparatively high
threshold’, and Blum and Kalven (1953, p. 4) suggest that, ‘it is almost unanimously agreed that some
exemption keyed to at least a minimum subsistence standard of living is desirable’. It should also be
remembered that tax rates were initially very low, there was no pay-as-you-go collection mechanism and
income declarations were diﬃcult to monitor.
7The later utilitarian approaches redeﬁned Mill’s ‘equal sacriﬁc e ’t om e a n‘ e q u a lm a r g i n a ls a c r i ﬁce’, thus
implying minimum aggregate sacriﬁce.
8This is similar to the current Australian low income tax oﬀset, where low-income individuals in essence
receive additional tax-free income, which is taken away at higher income levels by increasing the marginal
tax rate.
9On degression, see for example Bastable (1903, pp. 316-317), de Viti de Marco (1936, pp. 289-
290). Goode (1964, p. 226) refers to a ‘vanishing exemption’. Cassel (1901) suggested that the tax-free
threshold should actually increase as income increases, because expenditure on necessities increases, while
still maintaining a structure that can be described as being progressive.
4system, see, for example, Groenewegen (1990). The income tax structure also came to exist
alongside a complex range of (usually means-tested) transfer payments. The latter feature
m e a n st h a tt h e r ei so f t e na no v e r l a pb e t w e e nt h et a xa n db e n e ﬁts y s t e m s ,s ot h a tm a n y
beneﬁt recipients are also liable to pay income tax. The overlap has in turn led to the
introduction of tax ‘rebates’, also subject to what are variously called taper, withdrawal or
abatement rates. In attempts to improve the ‘target eﬃciency’ of tax and transfer systems,
eﬀective marginal tax rates (allowing for all tax rates and tapers) are typically highest for
t h el o w - i n c o m eb e n e ﬁt recipients, although their average tax rates are negative.
An increase in the tax-free threshold, while moving some individuals out of the tax
‘net’, provides a beneﬁt to all taxpayers so that, as a way of helping the poor, it is not
well-targeted. Furthermore, in a tax and transfer system consisting of a range of taxes and
beneﬁts, what matters is the overall eﬀect rather than that of a single tax, so it is far from
clear that the role of the tax-free threshold corresponds to its original one of helping low-
income individuals at a subsistence level. The fact that many beneﬁt reforms are introduced
independently without full consideration of the overall eﬀects can easily lead to unintended
consequences, such as discontinuities in the relationship between gross and net income and
ranges where marginal tax rates can exceed 100 percent.
In modern tax and transfer systems it is therefore by no means unusual for individuals
both to pay income tax (which for some people is partly compensated by income tax rebates)
and receive beneﬁts.10 Given the presence of income tax rebates, the need for a tax-free
threshold is not as strong as formerly. The simplest tax and transfer system is an integrated
‘basic income — ﬂat tax’ structure (or BI—FT) which has no role for a tax-free threshold
but instead combines a universal (non-means-tested) basic income with a proportional tax
applied to all income: for an extensive discussion of this option, see Atkinson (1996). Never-
theless, although there has been a general movement towards ﬂatter rate scales over the last
15 or so years, very few countries have adopted an income tax structure without a tax-free
threshold. An exception is New Zealand. However, the use of personal allowances meant
that there was an eﬀective tax-free threshold from the introduction of the income tax in
1891 until 1972. There is now a relatively broad base, with a range of tax rebates for low
incomes, a combination of diﬀerent means-tested transfer payments and a progressive, or
graduated, marginal income tax rate structure. For discussion of the tax reform changes in
10Bastable (1903, p. 319) suggested that ‘In any country where legal provision is made for poor relief,
it would seem that to tax those at the point of minimum subsistence would be simply to drive them into
the ranks of pauperism, and to take with one hand in order to give back with the other’. But there is no
longer anything unusual about giving with one hand while taking with another.
5New Zealand, see Stevens (1990).
In Australia, no indexation has taken place from 2000/2001 up to 2003/2004, when the
tax thresholds were increased slightly, and again in 2004/2005. In 2005/2006 and 2006/2007
larger increases were introduced, particularly for the top two tax thresholds. The tax-free
income threshold has not changed since 2000/2001. Before the July 2000 change, there
was no indexation over a long period. Hence there have been calls to increase the tax-free
threshold as a way of helping low-income groups. But, as mentioned above, such an increase
gives the same support to higher-rate taxpayers. The question is how might elimination of
the Australian tax-free threshold be achieved with minimal impacts on lower-income groups?
O n ea l t e r n a t i v em a yb et oa b o l i s ht h et a x - f r e ei n c o m er a n g ea n dr e p l a c et h i sw i t has i m i l a r
amount in rebates for lower income individuals. The remaining funds could be used to pay
for a reduction in the middle income tax rates to compensate those on middle and higher
incomes (outside of the range of the new rebate) at least partly. Such a policy change could
be expected to result in labour supply eﬀects, since high-level rebates extend further up the
income scale and thus lead to higher eﬀective marginal rates for all people who have income
in the extended rebate withdrawal range. In addition, higher taxes are expected for high
income groups if the increase in tax base is not suﬃcient to allow tax rates to be reduced
by a large enough amount to compensate each individual fully for the loss of the tax-free
income range.
Determining a revenue-neutral policy change that abolishes the tax-free income range
is complex, as is the determination of potential labour supply responses with a range of
eﬀects working in opposite directions. A proper analysis requires a microsimulation model
to evaluate the hypothetical policy options and enable full inclusion of all aspects of the
reform. However, before reporting a policy simulation using a behavioural microsimulation
model for Australia, the following section considers some basic aspects of integrated tax and
transfer systems.
3 Comparison of Alternative Tax Structures
This section considers, using a simple framework, the potential implications of a reform
involving elimination of the tax-free threshold in a range of diﬀerent income tax systems.
In particular, it raises the question of whether a revenue-neutral and distribution-neutral
reform is possible in principle, and considers potential labour supply responses and welfare
implications arising from alternative reforms. This discussion assists in designing sensible
policy options for investigation.
6Subsection 3.1 discusses the case of income tax in isolation, while subsection 3.2 intro-
duces transfer payments in the simplest possible system, that of a proportional income tax
combined with a basic income. Variations involving means-tested beneﬁts are then exam-
ined in subsections 3.3 and 3.4. Means-tested transfer payments form an important part of
the tax structures of many countries.
3.1 Income Tax Only
Consider ﬁrst the income tax system in isolation, and suppose that initially there is only
one (positive) marginal tax rate of t and a tax-free threshold of a.11 Hence income tax paid
on an income of y, denoted T (y),i sg i v e nb y :
T (y)=t(y − a) y>a
T (y)=0 y 6 a (1)
For taxpayers, the average tax rate is t(1 − a/y), which clearly increases towards t with
increasing y. Marginal and average rates for this income tax structure are illustrated in
Figure 1. This system has an increasing average tax rate and is thus progressive, for incomes
over a. Overall it is inequality reducing (the inequality of post-tax is less than that of pre-
tax income) so long as a is not too high.12 It is this characteristic that provides the basic
motivation for the use of a tax-free threshold. Indeed, when income tax was ﬁrst introduced,
there were typically no transfer payments. However, in modern systems with many diﬀerent
types of beneﬁt, what matters is the overall eﬀect, rather than the eﬀect of a single tax in
isolation.
In fact, the income tax with a tax-free threshold shares characteristics of a combined
tax and transfer scheme. This is because, for taxpayers, net (after income tax) income, z,
is:
z = at +( 1− t)y (2)
For y>a , this income tax system is equivalent to a BI—FT tax and transfer system (a linear
tax) with a basic income of at and a ﬂat tax rate t. This characteristic provides a motivation
for eliminating the tax-free threshold. With a tax-free threshold, any attempt to help the
very low paid taxpayers — those close to, but above, the threshold — by raising the threshold
11A system of personal allowances is equivalent to a tax-free threshold, though allowances may vary by
household size and composition.
12If t is held constant and a is increased, inequality gradually falls. However, if for already high tax-
free thresholds a, the threshold is further increased, very few people remain to pay tax, so that inequality
increases, since the post-tax distribution again moves closer to the pre-tax distribution. For inequality to













Figure 1: Marginal and Average Tax Rates with a Tax-free Threshold
and taking them out of the ‘tax net’ is accompanied by a simultaneous increase in the
implicit transfer given to all taxpayers. Furthermore, if there is marginal rate progression
and increasing the threshold shifts all the other income tax thresholds up by the same
amount as the tax-free threshold increase, then the increase is highest for the higher rate-
payers. A further motivation for eliminating the tax-free threshold is that the accounting
period and the unit of analysis are no longer relevant.13




(y − a)dF (y) (3)
where F (y) is the distribution function of pre-tax income and 0 6 y<∞.T h i s c a n b e
written as R = t¯ yG(a) where ¯ y is expected income
R ∞
0 ydF (y) and:
G(a)={1 − F1 (a)} −
a
¯ y
{1 − F (a)} (4)
and F1 (a) denotes the ﬁrst moment distribution function, that is the proportion of total
income in the population obtained by those with income below a.14 Clearly, G(0) = 1,a n d
a proportional, or ﬂat, tax raises R = t¯ y per person.
Eliminating the tax-free threshold therefore obviously increases the revenue raised from
the income tax. A revenue-neutral elimination of the threshold allows a reduction in the
constant marginal tax rate, now applying over all y>0,t ob em a d e . I ft h en e wr a t ei s
denoted t0, then:
t
0 = tG(a) (5)
13Considerable energy is involved in treating the accounting period for tax purposes as a single year,
when individuals have ﬂuctuating incomes and other circumstances during the year, and are subject to
pay-as-you-go tax collection.
14The function G(.), and extensions, has a fundamental role in the analysis of tax and transfer systems;
see Creedy (1996).
8However, such a change involves a move from a progressive income tax to one having a
constant average rate t0.T h i sa ﬀects the income distribution, beneﬁting high-income indi-
viduals relative to lower-income individuals.
Some progression can be re-introduced by the explicit introduction of a transfer payment
or rebate which is given to low-income individuals, or a transfer applying over the whole
range of incomes. In principle it would be possible to eliminate the tax-free threshold while
retaining precisely the same relationship between gross and net income, by giving a transfer
of at to all those with y>a , and introducing a means tested beneﬁto fB (y)=ty for
those with y<a . T h i si se ﬀectively a tax rebate which cancels the eﬀect of the income
tax. Such a change in administration would make no sense where there is no well-developed
tax administration, poor monitoring of incomes, a large number of individuals in the lower
income groups, and low tax revenue. It is thus not surprising that a ‘degressive’ system was
used in the UK for many years in order to achieve proportionality for the higher-income
groups: a tax rebate (taking with one hand and giving with the other) would have been
extremely cumbersome. However, in the modern context, a rebate for low-income groups is
feasible as one component of a range of income transfers.
3.2 Basic Income—Flat Tax System
Instead of a means-tested beneﬁt, consider the use of an unconditional basic income; that
is, a BI—FT system. Suppose a non-means-tested transfer payment of b is introduced, and
the ﬂat-tax rate is t∗. Net income for all individuals is thus:
z = b +( 1− t
∗)y (6)
This system is unambiguously progressive as total tax paid, T (y)=t∗y−b,a n dt h ea v e r a g e
tax rate, t∗ −b/y, increases over the whole range of income. The latter is initially negative,
becomes zero at y = b/t∗ and asymptotically approaches t∗ as y increases. Average and
marginal rates for this structure are shown in Figure 2. With its negative tax for incomes
below b/t∗ a n dw i t hi t sh i g h e rt a xr a t et∗ (compared to t in the previous section), this system
is clearly more progressive than the income tax alone so the reform is not distribution-
neutral.
To ensure that a reform, involving replacement of the income tax in subsection 3.1 with















Figure 2: Tax Rates in the Linear Tax Structure






Everyone receives b rather than only those above a receiving an implicit transfer of at,s o
it is not possible to have b = at and t = t∗ w i t h o u tr e d u c i n gt o t a ln e tr e v e n u e .T h u si ti s
possible to have a revenue-neutral but not a distribution-neutral reform involving a move
from a tax-free threshold to a basic income with a ﬂat tax.
The above results apply for a ﬁxed distribution of pre-tax income. However, in addition
to distributional eﬀects, the reform may also be expected to have labour supply eﬀects. This
complicates matters further; for example to remain revenue neutral, further adjustments to
the tax parameters b and t∗ would be required. The direction of the labour supply eﬀects
is ambiguous and needs to be determined empirically. High-income groups face a lower
marginal rate if t∗ <t , giving rise to a substitution eﬀect, while at the same time also facing
an income eﬀect. Due to the income eﬀect of receiving a basic income b and the higher
marginal tax rate t∗, the labour supply of some of those previously having an income y<a
is likely to fall, in some cases to the non-participation corner of the budget constraint.
3.3 Income Tax with a Minimum Income Guarantee
Consider now an income tax having a tax-free threshold of a combined with a minimum
income guarantee such that all those with y below a have their net income brought up to
the level a. Hence, for y<a ,b e n e ﬁts are given by B1 (y)=a − y and the MIG involves
means-testing with a taper rate of 100 percent. The relationship between net and gross



























Figure 3: A Minimum Income Guarantee
Suppose the tax-free threshold is eliminated but the MIG still guarantees a minimum
income of a for those with y<a . Hence for y<a :
z = y − ty + B2 (y)=a (9)
and beneﬁts are given by:
B2 (y)=a − (1 − t)y (10)
Abolishing the tax-free income therefore involves a reduction in the beneﬁt taper rate, from
1t o1 − t, to allow for the fact that each extra dollar of income also attracts income tax.
Of course, the overall eﬀective marginal tax rate continues to be 100 percent. Those with
y>a , who initially receive an implicit transfer of at while being taxed implicitly at the ﬂat
rate of t on all their income, can now be given an explicit unconditional basic income of
B (y)=b = at.
Hence in this special case it is possible to combine the elimination of a tax-free threshold
with a slight reform of the beneﬁt structure in order to maintain precisely the same relation-
ship between net and gross income. This involves a relatively minor change in administration
in view of the fact that means testing was initially applied to low-income groups, thereby
requiring an existing sophisticated tax and beneﬁt structure. The change is revenue- and
distribution-neutral and would simply be a change in the administrative arrangements.
However, elimination of the tax-free threshold is motivated by a desire to ﬂatten the
income tax structure and to take away the implicit transfer given to those higher-income
11individuals who pay tax. An alternative reform, instead of maintaining the eﬀective status
quo of the MIG with a tax-free threshold, might not introduce a basic income for tax
payers but, keeping the MIG at the level a, extend the income range over which individuals
are entitled to the means-tested beneﬁt. Suppose the tax-free threshold is eliminated, the
marginal and average income tax rate applying to everyone becomes t0 and the MIG is























Figure 4: An Alternative Reform
For continuity in the relationship between z and y it is required to have:





1 − t0 (12)
The above reform is clearly not distribution-neutral. However, it can be made revenue-
neutral. Consider the eﬀect on the tax rate t0, needed to achieve revenue neutrality given
a ﬁxed distribution of y. Under the pre-reform tax structure, suppose that non-transfer
expenditure of E per person must be ﬁnanced from the income tax system, in addition to




(a − y)dF (y)=t
Z ∞
a
(y − a)dF (y) (13)
12It can be shown, using the expression G(a) from (4), that:15
t =
E/¯ y + {G(a) − (1 − a/¯ y)}
G(a)
(14)




{a − (1 − t
0)y}dF (y)=t
0¯ y (15)
















This expression does not provide a closed-form solution for t0 as it is highly nonlinear, with
t e r m si nb o t hi n t e g r a l sF and F1 depending on t0, along with their limits of integration.
However, it seems likely that t0 <t .
In practice the above results would be modiﬁed by labour supply responses to the change
in the tax structure, since the expressions assume a ﬁxed distribution of y. The extension in
the range of y for which means testing applies (with a taper rate of 1−t0)m e a n st h a tm o r e
lower-income individuals, who previously simply paid income tax, now receive means-tested
beneﬁts and thus face a higher marginal tax rate (since in practice t0 < 0.5 and the taper
rate exceeds the income tax rate). Hence their labour supply is likely to fall. Higher income
individuals face a lower marginal tax rate if t0 <t , giving rise to a substitution eﬀect in
favour of higher labour supply, and simultaneously there is an income eﬀect in the same
direction because of the elimination of the implicit transfer of at.T h eo v e r a l le ﬀe c ta tt h e
population level is thus unclear.
3.4 A Modiﬁed Minimum Income Guarantee
In practice, tax and transfer systems do not usually have the simple MIG form examined
in the previous subsection. Beneﬁts typically have a taper rate s,w h e r et<s<1,a n d
a range of ‘free’ income before the taper begins to apply. Furthermore, the receipt of the
transfer payment extends beyond y = a.A s i m p l i ﬁed form of tax and transfer system,
referred to as a modiﬁed MIG, is shown in Figure 5, where the relationship between net
(after-tax-and-transfer) income and gross income is shown by the piecewise-linear schedule
15When a =0 , and there is no MIG nor a tax-free threshold, this reduces to the simple expression,
t = E/¯ y.
13ABCD. The diagram concentrates on the lower ranges of the income distribution. To reduce
the number of parameters involved, the form illustrated assumes that the taper-free range
of the beneﬁti st h es a m ea st h et a x - f r e er a n g eo ft h ei n c o m et a xs t r u c t u r e ,e q u a lt oa.
Although in practice, tax and transfer systems are usually highly complex, with numerous
overlapping beneﬁts, each with its own threshold, the simple form shown in Figure 5 is a

























Figure 5: A Modiﬁed Minimum Income Guarantee
In the pre-reform situation, suppose the beneﬁt received when y =0is equal to B (0) = b.
As continuity is imposed on the relationship, the point B in Figure 5 must correspond to
a net income of z = a + b. The segment BC, when continued to the net income axis,
must have an intercept of b + as.16 Furthermore, the threshold income yT,a b o v ew h i c h
the means-tested beneﬁt is exhausted and individuals only pay income tax, is given by the
constraint imposing continuity between sections BC and CD:






16This is because it must be the case that if q is the intercept, a + b = q +a(1 − s),w h i c hc a nb es o l v e d
for q.
14For those between B and C, the net transfer, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between their net
income z and their gross income y,i sg i v e nb y :
z − y = {b + as + at +( 1− s − t)y} − y
= b − (t + s)(y − a) (19)






a {b − (t + s)(y − a)}dF (y)=t
R ∞
(b+as)/s (y − a)dF (y)
(20)
This is clearly highly nonlinear because s aﬀects the limits of integration.
A reform involving the elimination of the tax-free threshold in the income tax would
generate extra revenue. The latter could be used to reduce the income tax rate to t0.I n
addition, a tax rebate could be introduced in order to maintain the section AB. Individuals,
who previously paid no tax as they were below the tax-free threshold a, would need to
receive a tax rebate of t0y up to a maximum of t0a. The tax rebate would have a taper rate
str applying above a. This taper rate can be chosen so that the tax rebate is exhausted at
t h es a m et i m ea st h eb e n e ﬁt b at threshold yT.17 This reform implies that individuals with
gross income between a and yT face a higher eﬀective marginal tax rate than before; that
is, people formerly subject to the means-tested taper rate s now face an additional taper
rate str corresponding to the withdrawal of the tax rebate. This system is shown in Figure
6. The point C moves downward to C0 due to the introduction of the new taper rate str,
which needs to be larger than the reduction in the income tax rate. Again the reform is not
completely distribution-neutral. The overall eﬀect on net income inequality is not obvious
as it depends on the pre-tax income distribution.
The condition required for revenue-neutrality is complex in this case, again because of
the nonlinearities involved. As mentioned above, the marginal income tax rate is changed
to t0 when the tax-free threshold is abolished. The continuity of the section BC0 and C0D0
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where s0 = s + str.H e n c e :
yT =
b + as0 + at0
s0 (22)



























Figure 6: The Modiﬁed MIG without a Tax-Free Threshold
By combining equations (22) and (18), it is possible to solve for str to ensure that both





The net transfer received by those with pre-tax income between a and yT becomes:
z − y = {b + as
0 + at
0 +( 1− s
0 − t
0)y} − y
= b − (s
0 + t
0)(y − a) (24)
and this is smaller than in the pre-reform situation because (s0 + t0) has to be larger than
(s + t) in order to satisfy the government budget constraint. That is, extra government
revenue has to be generated by individuals on the section BE to ﬁnance the cost of the






a {b − (s0 + t0)(y − a)}dF (y)=t0 R ∞
(b+as0+at0)/s0 ydF (y)
(25)
Again a closed-form solution for t0 is not available.
The labour supply implications of this type of piecewise-linear tax and transfer system
are complex, particularly because there is an increase in the eﬀective marginal tax rate over
16a range (section BC) combine with a decrease above yT as entitlement to the means-tested
beneﬁt and tax rebate is exhausted.18
Again the above results are likely to be modiﬁed by labour supply responses to the tax
reform. Their overall eﬀect is unclear ap r i o r ias it depends on the initial distribution of
income and the balance of income and substitution eﬀects. This reform involves a minimum
of changes — adjusting t while keeping net incomes of the low-income people unchanged by
introducing a tax rebate — and of course it would be possible to modify other parameters.
4 A Policy Simulation for Australia
The previous section shows that, even in simple stylised structures, it is not easy to design
policy changes involving elimination of the tax-free threshold which are both revenue and
distribution neutral. This may be further complicated by labour supply responses. Practical
policy analysis requires the use of a behavioural microsimulation model, capable of dealing
with the full complexity of the many elements of the tax and transfer system and the
considerable degree of population heterogeneity, as well as labour supply behaviour.
The Melbourne Institute Tax and Transfer Simulator (MITTS) provides such a policy
tool.19 It is used in this section to examine the eﬀects of a hypothetical policy change
in Australia, involving the abolition of the tax-free threshold. The Survey of Income and
Housing Costs (SIHC) for 2003/2004 was used as the database in the analyses in this paper.
Hence the tax and beneﬁt changes examined apply to rates and thresholds in that year. The
policy change is described in subsection 4.1. Summary results are reported in subsection
4.2.
4.1 The Hypothetical Policy Change
The policy change examined involves eliminating the tax-free threshold, using (approxi-
mately) revenue-neutral tax rates, obtained from a process of trial and error. Adjustments
were made to the rates, rather than the tax thresholds, and only integer tax rates were
considered. The costs of reducing each of the marginal tax rates separately by one percent-
age point were found to be approximately 1.4 billion dollars for the 17 per cent tax rate,
18See Creedy and Kalb (2006, 2005) for discussion of labour supply modelling in continuous and discrete
hours models.
19For details on MITTS, see Creedy et al. (2002). Creedy and Kalb (2006) describe some of the more
recently introduced features of MITTS, and Kalb and Lee (2007, 2008) report updated wage and labour
supply estimates underlying the labour supply responses in the behavioural simulations.
171.5 billion dollars for the 30 per cent tax rate, 200 million dollars for the 42 per cent tax
rate and 500 million dollars for the 47 per cent tax rate. These are indicative values at the
margin and they assume ﬁxed labour supply. The cost of further reducing the marginal tax
rates is not expected to be linear. Table 1 gives the marginal tax rates applying between
the relevant thresholds in the current structure and in the alternative policy.
Table 1: Marginal Tax Rates (in Per Cent)
Income Initial Alternative
range tax rate tax rate
1 0 - 6000 0 17
2 6000 - 21600 17 17
3 21600 - 52000 30 27
4 52000 - 62500 42 42
5 over 62500 47 47
The tax-free threshold is eliminated and everyone earning less than $21,600 in 2003/04
is compensated with an additional Low Income Tax Oﬀset of $1,020 (added to the $235
that was available in 2003/04). This policy corresponds to going from Figure 5 to Figure
6 in Section 3.4. This oﬀ-set of $1,020 corresponds to 17 per cent of $6,000, which is paid
in additional tax under the new tax system. The remaining excess revenue collected from
the higher-income earners is used to reduce the middle income tax rate from 30 to 27 per
cent. This policy change is designed to be approximately revenue neutral under ﬁxed labour
supply.
Assuming ﬁxed labour supply, the amount of Pension Rebates decreases by $19.6 million
for couples. Furthermore, 63,000 fewer individuals receive it.20 This arises from the fact
that unlike other rebates, excess Pension Rebate (relative to income tax payable) can be
transferred from one partner to the other within a couple family. This is done without
taking other rebates into account; details of the Pension Rebate and the Low Income Tax
Oﬀset are given in the Appendix.21 Based on the 2003/04 SIHC sample, 127,000 persons
on an individual gross income below $21,600 are expected to experience a decrease in their
individual net income following the decrease in their Pension Rebate (the unweighted num-
ber in the SIHC is 187). This is due to the fact that less Pension Rebate can be transferred
to them by their partner after the tax increase. To compensate for this small reduction in
20These aggregate ﬁgures are obtained by multiplying the samples numbers by their sample weights,
provided in the SIHC.
21For details of the wide range of beneﬁts in Australia, see Australian Government Department of Family
and Community Services (2004). For details on taxes and rebates, see Australian Taxation Oﬃce (2006).
18Table 2: Summary of Aggregate Results (Million Dollars per Year)
Couples Single Single Single All
men women parents
Change in:
N e tg o v tr e v e n u e( ﬁxed labour supply) 92 -32 -38 -9 13
Net govt revenue (variable lab. sup.) 61 -29 -33 0 -1
Average hours (in hours per week) 0.00/0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01
Aggregate net income -130 30 37 18 -44
Compensating variation (CV) 91 -32 -38 -9 11
Equivalent variation (EV) 91 -32 -38 -9 12
the Pension Rebate for some low-income couples, low-income partnered pension recipients
could be given a Pension Rebate top-up. However, this would mean some other pension
recipients would be overcompensated as a result.
4.2 Summary of Eﬀects of Policy Change
Table 2 summarises the aggregate results, separately for four demographic groups. Separate
econometric estimates of preference functions are available within MITTS for each of the
demographic groups. For couples, the ﬁrst ﬁgure for average hours change relates to the
male partner while the second ﬁgure is for the female partner.
Aggregate eﬀects of the policy changes are calculated by adding equivalent variations
(EV), compensating variations (CV) and net incomes across all income units, using the
survey weights provided with the SIHC data to obtain population level results. A positive
v a l u ef o rt h ec o m p e n s a t i n go re q u i v a l e n tv a r i a t i o ni n d i c a t e saw e l f a r el o s s . I nt e r m so f
social evaluations, the focus on aggregate amounts can be regarded as equivalent to the
assumption of zero relative inequality aversion.
The results show very small changes. This is because low-income households are almost
fully compensated by the additional Low Income Tax Oﬀset. As a result, their labour supply
responses are negligible and the policy change is approximately revenue neutral under both
ﬁxed and ﬂexible labour supply assumptions. Couples appear to be the only demographic
group losing from the policy change in terms of aggregate net income and welfare. As
explained in Section 4.1, this is due to the Pension Rebate being held constant. In addition,
couples are more likely to be on a higher income than other groups and are therefore less
likely to be fully compensated.
Summary information regarding winners and losers by income unit decile, while taking
19into account the predicted labour response, is reported in Table 3. Virtually none of the
income units in the bottom three deciles lose, while the proportion of losers goes up with
income level. For high-income households, the elimination of the tax-free threshold is not
entirely compensated by the tax cuts. The net income gains for low-income households are
achieved through an increase in labour supply, which explains the limited welfare gains.
By contrast, the decrease in net income for high-income households is partly caused by a
reduction in labour supply, which limits their welfare losses.
Table 3: Winners and Losers by Income Unit Decile
Decilea Percentage of Ave. change in adult- Number of
population who: equivalent (in $/year) individuals
Stay (000s)
Loseb equal Winb Net income EV
1 0.0 80.3 19.7 32.08 -0.06 1,188
2 0.0 90.2 9.8 10.95 -0.25 1,569
3 0.7 73.6 25.8 20.11 -6.98 1,836
4 11.8 37.1 51.1 2.61 3.93 2,322
5 28.9 10.4 60.7 -5.80 7.82 2,207
6 33.1 4.0 62.9 38.89 -38.81 2,122
7 39.7 1.2 59.1 21.26 -28.02 2,204
8 48.7 1.1 50.1 1.55 -13.23 2,108
9 68.3 2.5 29.2 -51.64 28.31 1,973
10 89.2 0.4 10.4 -102.31 71.15 1,986
Total 34.1 25.7 40.3 -4.45 1.96 19,516
Notes: a) Income unit deciles are based on net income unit income per adult
equivalent (before the policy change).
b) Winners are individuals whose net income unit income per adult equivalent
goes up by more than $1 per year. Likewise, losers experience a decrease in
their net income unit income per adult equivalent of more than $1 per year.
The policy change is very close to being distribution neutral. The decrease in the Gini
coeﬃcient is limited to 0.2 per cent (the Gini decreases from 0.2186 to 0.2184 for the money
metric and from 0.2851 to 0.2845 for net income). This slight decline in net income inequality
is essentially due to the reduction in net income for some high-income households.
Table 4 summarises the labour supply responses. The increase in the labour supply of
low-income households is inﬂuenced mainly by the reduction in the middle income tax rate
from 30 to 27 per cent. For higher-income deciles this eﬀect is likely to be oﬀset by the
impact of the elimination of the tax-free threshold, as the additional rebate is withdrawn
20at a rate of 4 per cent once individuals earn more than $21,600 per year. Hence, for higher
income deciles, the proportions of individuals reducing their labour supply become larger
than the proportions of those increasing their labour supply. Middle-income households are
also more likely to face a higher eﬀective marginal tax rate since the increased Low Income
Tax Oﬀset is tapered out over a larger range of their income.
Table 4: Labour Supply Responses by Income Unit Decile
Men Women
Change in hours Change in hours
(per cent) Number (per cent) Number
Decile Less None more (000s) Less None more (000s)
1 0.0 81.5 18.5 552 0.0 85.7 14.3 524
2 0.0 94.3 5.7 601 0.1 94.2 5.7 772
3 0.4 93.8 5.8 574 0.3 90.1 9.6 754
4 5.5 89.0 5.5 700 1.3 89.7 9.0 833
5 9.9 85.9 4.3 701 3.1 88.0 8.9 779
6 9.2 87.8 3.1 729 5.2 87.4 7.4 713
7 14.7 81.9 3.4 756 11.7 79.4 8.9 739
8 16.0 80.7 3.3 805 13.8 78.7 7.5 750
9 21.7 75.0 3.2 811 19.6 74.0 6.4 744
10 18.1 79.0 2.9 891 20.3 76.1 3.6 753
Total 10.6 84.3 5.1 7,122 7.7 84.4 8.0 7,361
5C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper has examined the role of the tax-free income tax threshold in a complex tax
and transfer system consisting of a range of taxes and beneﬁts, each with their own taper
rates and thresholds. When considering the introduction of income taxation in societies
which had no signiﬁcant transfer payments and with many individuals regarded as being
at a subsistence level, it is not surprising that a tax-free threshold was used. However,
particularly in the UK, a ‘degressive’ rate structure was used to produce proportionality
at the higher-income levels: progressivity was not a primary objective of the tax system.
Considering a range of tax and beneﬁt systems, particularly those having beneﬁtt a p e rr a t e s
whereby some beneﬁts are received by income groups other than those at the bottom of the
distribution, for which a sophisticated revenue collection and beneﬁt payment system is in
place, it was suggested that a tax-free threshold is not a necessary requirement to achieve
21redistribution. The simultaneous payment of tax and receipt of beneﬁts does not generate
excessive diﬃculties. What matters is the overall eﬀect of the system.
A policy change involving the elimination of the tax-free threshold in Australia, designed
to achieve approximate revenue neutrality, was examined using the Melbourne Institute Tax
and Transfer Simulator. The policy ensures that low-income individuals are fully compen-
sated through an extension of the Low Income Tax Oﬀset. In addition, the extra revenue
raised from higher incomes as a result of the extension of the tax base was used to reduce
t h em i d d l e( m a r g i n a l )i n c o m et a xr a t e .T h ep o l i c yw a sc l o s et ob e i n gb o t hr e v e n u en e u t r a l
and distribution neutral. A range of implications were examined, including labour supply
responses to tax changes. As a result of the small changes, labour supply incentives hardly
changed and therefore labour supply remained nearly the same as before the policy change.
H e n c ei ti sp o s s i b l et oe l i m i n a t et h et a x - f r e et h r e s h o l du n d e ra p p r o x i m a t eo v e r a l lr e v e n u e
and distribution neutrality, but labour supply incentives cannot be improved at the same
time.
22Appendix: Rebates
In Australia, a number of rebates (or oﬀsets) are available to reduce the tax payable for
speciﬁc groups. The rebates can only be used to oﬀset taxes that are payable; they cannot be
paid. Rebates reduce the tax payable by a certain amount rather than the taxable income.
This appendix discusses the two rebates that are most relevant in the policy change analysed
in this paper: the Pension Rebate and the Low Income Tax Oﬀset.
The Pension Rebate
All recipients of taxable social security and Veterans Aﬀairs service pensions, including the
parenting payment (single), may be eligible for the pensioner rebate. Once taxable income
reaches a threshold of yT the rebate is shaded out at 12.5 cents for each dollar above the
threshold. The maximum rebate level is calculated as the diﬀerence between the threshold
level of income, yT, and the tax-free (or ﬁrst) threshold yTFT (AU$6,000 per year) multiplied
by the lowest marginal tax rate, τL (17 per cent). Thus the maximum rebate, maxPR, is
given by:
maxPR= τL(yT − yTFT) (A.1)
The threshold amount is the sum of the maximum annual base pension payable, PB, plus
the income-free area for the pension per person, PF/n (where n is 1 or 2, depending on
whether the individual is single or partnered). These two amounts diﬀer depending on the
type of pension and the composition of the household. Thus:
yT = PB + PF/n (A.2)
The pensioner rebate is thus calculated as:
PR =m a xPR if y<y T
=m a x [ 0 ,maxPR− 0.125(y − yT)] if y ≥ yT
(A.3)
Partnered pensioners can transfer the unused portion of their rebate to their partner if the
partner has a tax liability. However, the calculation of the unused portion of their rebate
does not take the presence of other rebates into account. If the amount of the Pension
Rebate is less than the amount of income tax to be paid, no transfer takes place.
In the policy examined in this paper, yTFT is kept at AU$6,000 since the Low Income
Tax Oﬀs e tt a k e so v e rt h er o l eo ft h et a x - f r e ei n c o m er a n g ef o rl o w - i n c o m eh o u s e h o l d s .T h e
tax rate in the ﬁrst income range is in eﬀect raised from 0 to 17 per cent, while keeping the
ﬁrst tax threshold, although there is no longer a tax rate change at this level. The problem
23(as mentioned in Section 4.1)under this policy arises because low-income individuals now
transfer less rebate to their partners, since they start paying tax from the ﬁrst dollar of
earnings. Although the additional tax payment is compensated by the increased Low Income
Tax Oﬀset, the pension rebate calculation does not take into account this increased Low
Income Tax Oﬀset and assumes that the low-income individual pays enough tax to oﬀset
the Pension Rebate against. At the ﬁnal stage of rebate calculation, when all rebates are
added together, there is more rebate than tax payable for these low-income individuals. As
a result, less than the full sum of rebates is paid out and the higher income partner does
not beneﬁt to the same extent as before from a transfer in the Pension Rebate, resulting in
a decrease in net income.
The Low Income Tax Oﬀset
Individuals with annual taxable income below AU$21,600 are entitled to the Low Income
Tax Oﬀset (LITO). The maximum level of the rebate is AU$235 per year and is reduced by
4 cents for every dollar of taxable income above the threshold. Denoting the individual’s
income by y, the annual amount of Low Income Tax Oﬀset is calculated as:
LITO =$ 2 3 5 if y<$21,600
=m a x [ 0 ,$235 − 0.04(y − $21,600)] if y ≥ $21,600 (A.4)
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